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The Frankenpaper
One or More Essays on Writing
and Frankenstein and Deleuze and . . .
This work is a rhizome, a burrow. The castle has multiple entrances whose rules 
of usage and whose locations aren’t very well known.
—Deleuze & Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature 
 We believe that this quotation situates our paper well; this paper emerges 
from an email sent from the second author to the first, containing the world “Fran-
kenproposal.” Her use of that portmanteau, a combining of “Frankenstein” and 
“proposal,” provided a fruitful avenue to begin a conversation about the writing 
process. What are the Franken- qualities of writing, and what are the limits of 
the Franken- analogy? What exactly is the nature of a Franken(stein)? What is 
the nature of any creative endeavor? Our conversation became too much to con-
tain; our thoughts meandered. They began to overlap and beget new ideas. The 
word “Frankenproposal” was an intersection of everything that had been said/
thought/written about Frankenstein and everything that had been said/thought/
written about (de)composition. The word “Frankenproposal” itself is a Franken-
monster, a coming together of parts to form a creature that cannot be contained 
within a single directed conversation; it takes on a life of its own. This paper is 
the result of our conversational spill-over and a rhizomatic intersecting of ideas. 
Like Macaully’s (1990) children’s book, Black and White, these pages may con-
tain a number of short independent essays: a literary analysis, an author’s writing 
biography, thoughts on writing theory; or it may be only one essay. Like Deleuze 
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and Guattari’s (1986) castle, it has many potential entrances. We leave our readers 
to discover points of dis/junction among the various ideas that have spilled onto 
these pages (if they want to), the result of two individual multiplicities engaged in 
a dialogue about Frankenstein… or writing… or Shelley… or Deleuze… or some 
or all of these topics, or even more than these. 
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The Frankenstein Monster:
Anti-Oedipus, Body without
Organs, a Phenomenon of
Bordering
“… the strange nature of 
the animal would elude all 
pursuit…”  
—Mary Shelley, Frankenstein 





“What is the Body Without 
Organs of a Book?”
Bringing the Post to Post-Pro-
cess Composing
 The post-process movement 
in composition studies adopts 
the term “post-” literally: 
process no longer explains how 
writing works, so we move 
somewhere else. Post- in this 
sense is “after” (Kent, 1999; 
Trimbur, 1994). This version of 
post- does not necessarily leave 
process entirely behind, but it 
moves the concept of process 
beyond the cogito
Holly’s Writing Reflection
 As horror writer Stephen 
King once said (appending 
on to a quote once written by 
William Faulkner), “…kill your 
darlings, kill your darlings, even 
when it breaks your egocentric 
little scribbler’s heart, kill 
your darlings” (King, 2000, 
p.222). The implications of this 
metaphor are simultaneously 
macabre and grossly accurate. 
Writing is an act of creation, and 
the manifestation of that creation 
is a product that
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 Consider the Frankenstein 
monster: it is the anti-Oedipus. 
Indeed, it has no mother to 
Oedipus about, and we cannot 
say that it was born in any 
kind of Freudian sexual frenzy. 
Rather, it wasn’t, and then one 
day, it was. While the common 
portrayal of the Frankenstein 
monster’s beginnings involve 
a body on a slab, scientific 
machinery, and harnessing the 
power of lightening, Shelley’s 
description of the monster’s 
“birth” is far less detailed: the 
narrator simply states that one
 When Mary Shelley added 
an introduction to the 1831 
publication of Frankenstein, 
she called this insertion 
“an appendage to a former 
production” that she promised 
to limit to “such topics as have 
connection to [her] authorship 
alone” (Shelley, 2017, p. 
291). The use of the word 
“appendage” is apt considering 
that the text to which Shelley 
adds this explanation to a body 
of writing that documents the 
aftereffects of one man’s efforts 
to create life through the
et scribo approach of 
cognitivism that had dominated 
writing in the 80s; it suggests 
that matters of context and 
audience are paramount in 
writing and that there can be no 
one series of steps that produces 
“good” writing. 
 But post- as a philosophical 
enterprise implies more than a 
simple social turn, which seems 
to be what the post-process 
movement ultimately boils 
down to (Breuch, 2002). Breuch 
notes that when applied to a 
discipline, post- has the potential 
to decenter the human
many refer to as a body of 
writing. In the same way that, 
at the moment of birth, a child’s 
body exits the mother’s womb 
and is suddenly present in a 
place where, only moments 
before there was merely the 
idea of a child, an author brings 
forth a body of writing…a child 
that, for better or worse, enters 
the world either as a divine 
creation or as a monster (maybe 
both). Though it is uncertain 
as to whether or not all writers 
experience this sensation, many 
writers perceive their work…this 
brainchild they have
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rainy night in November, he 
saw the accomplishment of his 
toils brought about by collecting 
“the instruments of life” around 
him. There is no description 
of these instruments. As such, 
popular media has taken the 
Frankenstein creation in any 
number of directions: most are 
familiar with James Whales’ 
1931 Frankenstein, for instance 
(“It’s alive!”), and there is the 
more elaborate Kenneth Branagh 
representation of the birth of the 
monster, wherein Frankenstein 
creates what is
cobbling together of a body…
an assemblage of parts sutured 
together to make a whole. In the 
appending of the introduction to 
the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, 
Shelley insists that she only 
did so in an effort to satisfy her 
publishers’ concerns that the 
body of work as it previously 
existed in the 1818 publication 
of the work was not whole; 
however, this explanation 
reinforces the idea that the novel 
Frankenstein is an assemblage; 
moreover, from a Deleuzian 
standpoint, we can use
(e.g. Barnett, 2015; Rickert, 2013); 
provide attention to infinitely 
complex minutiae (Mays, 
2017; Lynch & Rivers, 2015); 
and express incredulity with 
metanarratives of what writing is 
or should be. However, Breuch 
claims, post-process theory has 
yet to do this. Similarly, Heard 
(2008) asks what we should do 
with the post-process movement 
in writing. He observes that there 
was something called a post-
process movement, writing and 
composition theorists nodded their 
heads in acknowledgement, and
imprisoned in the page to be 
monstrous from its inception. 
Thoughts of the work’s 
ineptitude and ignorance plague 
the writer. “This paper can’t 
possibly be good enough…
everyone who reads this will 
hate it…please do not read my 
stuff because you’ll think badly 
of me once you see just how 
wretched, basic, and grotesque 
my writing skills are.” The writer 
finishes the writing, and, for a 
brief moment comes the feeling 
of relief at completion, but this 
moment can be fleeting.
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essentially an artificial womb. 
Harnessing the power of electric 
eels, Victor plunges probes 
into the body of his creature 
(the astute observer will not 
overlook the sexual implications 
of probing a body with rods or 
the phallic imagery of writhing 
eels in a yonic pool of liquid). 
Shortly thereafter, Robert De 
Nero is expelled in a deluge of 
amniotic fluid. This tells us that, 
at least in film representation, we 
cannot move beyond the idea of 
an Oedipal birth. There exists a 
fixation on pinning down
Shelley as a kind of case study 
to examine how authorial 
agency is, in fact, non-existent 
when speaking about the writing 
of a text. To understand any 
assemblage, one must embrace 
the multiplicities that exists 
within and around it as well 
as the intensities that inform 
it. Deleuze and Guattari posit 
that “a book has only itself, 
in connection with other 
assemblages and in relation to 
other bodies without organs” 
(p. 4). Frankenstein, therefore, 
has itself in connection with 
Shelley, the
then nothing happened. As 
late as 2017, Newcomb and 
Leshowitz observe that writing 
studies has become “stuck” in 
a space between process and 
post-process, unable to fully 
move into the realm of post-
process. It seems that post-
process, as a compositional 
movement, never had a chance 
to blossom to full potential, as 
it has been both undertheorized 
and underutilized. Barnett 
(2015) claims that composition, 
as a field, is only just beginning 
to think of the place that 
nonhuman actors occupy
How relatable this passage from 
Frankenstein: “I had desired it 
with an ardour that far exceeded 
moderation; but now that I had 
finished, the beauty of the dream 
vanished, and breathless horror 
and disgust filled my heart.” 
Upon beholding the finished 
body of work, the writer feels 
the exhilaration of “I really 
did it! I finished,” but this is 
followed by, “Oh God—what 
have I done?”
 If the body of writing 
manages to make it past this 
initial rejection by its creator, 
then
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the monster with human ori-
gins and rationality, even while 
Victor attempted to create a 
post-human species (Carrete-
ro-Gonzalez, 2016). We provide 
the monster with a beginning 
that we can wrap our collective 
heads around, if not ex-(faux)
utero, then at least with the 
vivacity provided by a lightning 
strike on a marble or metal slab. 
And why not this neurotic fix-
ation on the Oedipal? We have 
come to believe that “Oedipus 
is an easy subject to deal with, 
something perfectly obvious, a 
‘given’ that is
assemblages that constructed 
her, and the assemblages that 
she constructed, a recursive 
relationship of monstrous 
generation wherein Shelley 
becomes the vessel, rather than 
the author, of her magnum 
opus. Shelley, we feel, offers 
a particularly interesting case 
given the nature and topic of 
her writing, and we believe that 
the assembly of a monster, one 
driven by intensities of passion 
and grief, offers a metatextual 
reading of Shelley’s process.
in the discipline; Lynch and 
Rivers’ (2015) work, which 
houses Barnett’s, is an homage to 
complexity, to “extend invitations 
and assemble collectives” (p. 14) 
around composition. In this spirit, 
we explore the works of Deleuze 
(1990) and Guattari (1983; 1986; 
1987), thinking about what it 
might mean to post- process 
within the field of composition 
studies. 
 Writing was one of many 
topics discussed by Deleuze 
and Guattari, but it held a 
special importance for them, 
given their heavy
revision occurs. The author 
strikes the delete key or the 
eraser like the wielding of the 
axe, hacking away sentences, 
paragraphs, and pages like 
they were gangrenous limbs. 
Perhaps, along with this act 
of amputating superfluous 
prose, the author appends, or 
transplants works from another 
piece into the body of work, 
cannibalizing one no longer 
viable monstrosity to give life to 
another. 
 For the second author, this 
idea of cannibalizing one piece 
in the effort to create
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there from the very beginning” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 
26). 
 This the monster is not: not 
an easy subject, not obvious, not 
a given (not even a thing with 
a beginning). Thus, we create 
a neat narrative where Shelley 
provided none; as we confront 
the alien, the philosopher, 
or the monster, we “pinch it, 
probe it, and in the end dissect 
it. Laboriously, bit by bit… 
cobble together an identity for 
it” (Massumi, 2002, p. 233). We 
attempt to provide an “Oedipal
 Frankenstein is assembled 
through Shelley and, in turn, 
it assembles her own life. 
Traumatic experiences shaped 
Shelley’s life from birth. Eleven 
days after giving birth, her 
mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
died of a postpartum infection 
that left Shelley in the care of 
her William Godwin. Mellor 
(1988) indicates that, despite 
his biological relationship to his 
infant daughter, Godwin, who 
was a prominent British literary 
figure in his own right, preferred 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s
reliance on examples from 
literature and the fact that 
writing is intimately connected 
to some of their theoretical 
developments, such as the 
rhizome and schizoanalysis. 
Additionally, within the first 
pages of A Thousand Plateaus 
(1983), they ask us to consider 
“what is the body without 
organs [BwO] of a book” (p. 
4). And perhaps, whatever the 
answer might be, offers us one 
entry point into the question 
of what it might mean to post- 
writing studies. There is, of 
course, no one answer to this
another was how the concept 
of the “Frankenproposal” 
came to be. In an effort to put 
together a research proposal, 
she turned to the boneyard 
of her hard drive, looking 
for the written equivalent to 
“bones from charnel houses…
profane fingers…tremendous 
secrets of the human frame” 
so that she might use them 
again (Shelley, 1818, p. 55). 
In the end, she found two 
suitable corpses among piles of 
discarded writing. They existed 
because, at one point, they had 
satisfactorily fulfilled the
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organization” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983, p.123) for that 
which we do not understand, 
and as such, an “interminable 
proliferation” of psychoanalytic 
readings (Rieder, 2003, para. 
4) appear for the Frankenstein 
monster. Though Massumi is 
speaking about the outsider in 
general, his language evokes 
the same scientific lab present 
in various Frankenstein films 
wherein Victor does his work, 
providing a scientific rationale 
for the monster’s being. 
However, Massumi criticizes 
this scientifizing
illegitimate first daughter Fanny 
Imlay. This emotional distance 
between Mary Shelley and 
her father only worsened after 
Godwin married Mary Jane 
Clairmont in order to establish 
the financial security that his 
liberal ideals and lifestyle 
had deprived him of for many 
years. Clairmont and Mary did 
not have an easy relationship 
(Mellor, 1988), so the theme 
of parental absenteeism and 
rejection emerged for her at 
a young age. Mary Shelley’s 
decision to leave home to elope 
with Romantic poet Percy
question, but as we consider 
what a body without organs 
is, as well as what a book is 
and the elements that go into 
making a book (i.e., writing), we 
hope to touch upon one of the 
multiplicities that might compose 
a more serious post-process 
movement in composition. 
 What we see across 
Deleuze (1990) and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1983; 1987) 
work is that they attempt 
to dismantle individuations 
between content, writing, 
author, and reader, beginning 
with the idea that “there is no
requirements of one deadline 
or another, but, even at the 
time they had gone out into the 
world, the second author had 
known that they were deformed 
and that she would have to rip 
them apart and mend them back 
together again. Products of 
early journeys into qualitative 
research, they had been 
finished with a knowledge that 
something in them was flawed 
and monstrous. They could have 
very easily been completely 
discarded into the bone pile had 
the author not been willing to
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as a kind of “running in place,” 
a “limited and limiting view” (p. 
233) of the world. 
 Despite media 
representations, the Frankenstein 
monster is too free to be bogged 
down by this kind of Oedipal 
organization or scientifizing; 
its intrigue is its inability to be 
pinned, despite our attempts 
to do so, from vague birth to 
equally vague end, appearing 
here and there throughout the 
novel of Frankenstein, emerging 
unexpectedly at the top of a 
mountain and, shortly thereafter, 
among
Shelley would place further 
strain on the relationship 
between father and daughter 
(Brackett, 2016). Along with 
this lack of parental affection, 
she experienced turmoil 
throughout her relationship 
with Percy Shelley due to his 
desire to engage in a libertine 
lifestyle of sexual dalliances 
with Mary Shelley’s half-sister 
Claire Clairmont (Brackett, 
2016). In addition to these 
constant tensions, Mary 
gave birth to and lost shortly 
thereafter a premature daughter 
named Clara in
difference between what a book 
talks about and how it is made” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 4). 
Here, the line between process 
and content are obliviated. As 
one writes, the content drives the 
creation of the writing, and vice 
versa—writing creates content. 
But Deleuze and Guattari 
complicate writing further, 
stating that “there is no longer 
a tripartite division between a 
field of reality (the world) and a 
field of representation (the book) 
and a field of subjectivity (the 
author)” (p. 23). They seek to
acknowledge that, though the 
overall quality of the writings 
were something “permeated by 
unformed, unstable matters” 
(Deleuze and Guatarri, 1988, 
p. 4), the author recognized 
viability within parts of each 
draft and grafted the meat of 
each of these papers into the 
new body. 
 Odd that, even now, as this 
paper takes form, the same 
exploratory procedure of 
drafting is occurring. A previous 
draft written months ago gets 
pored over with surgical
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the icy wastes of the near-north 
pole, existing always “at the 
borderline of the village, or 
between villages” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 246), haunting 
the fringes. It is ubiquitous and 
ever-hidden. Its actions are 
conflicted and contradictory, 
forging friendships on one 
page, murdering the next. 
Indeed, contemporary reviews 
of Frankenstein treated 
the monster with equal 
amounts of fascination and 
discomfort, stemming from his 
indeterminate and independent 
nature. Walter Scott (1818),
1815. Following the birth of the 
Shelleys’ son William in 1816 
(he would die in 1819), Percy 
and Mary Shelley had come 
to reside in Geneva alongside 
Lord Byron. At this point in 
Mary Shelley’s life, following 
this accumulation of traumatic 
experiences, she would 
make the wager and have the 
nightmare that would inspire 
the creation of Frankenstein. 
Or, as Deleuze and Guttari 
might put it, her dream was 
“externalized, by a
obliviate the line that separates 
author from the book as well. 
The material that one writes 
about, the writing itself, and the 
one who writes—these exist 
as a singularity, penetrating 
and penetrated by one another. 
Writing, they state, exists as an 
assemblage with the external 
world, not as a representation of 
it, but a junction with it. A book 
is of the world as much as it is 
of an author, and the author is of 
the world and of the book: not a 
tripartite division,
precision. There are quotations 
and paragraphs within even this 
draft that had life before, but 
the organism they were a part of 
was monstrous in some way, so 
the author has cleaved the words 
from the bones of a previous 
draft. They are their own 
assemblage, part of the old draft 
and now part of the new. Should 
revision of this draft occur (and 
it probably will), they may or 
may not continue to be a part of 
the next assemblage.
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for instance, seemed confused 
by the monster’s freedom, 
stating that we should “be 
disposed … to question whether 
the monster… could have 
perpetrated so much mischief 
undiscovered, or passed through 
so many countries without being 
secured… (Scott, 1818, n.p.). 
How in the world, he seems 
to be saying, does it manage 
so well, despite the structures 
and strictures that we might 
place on it? On the other hand, 
an anonymous review from 
The Edinburgh Magazine and 
Literary Miscellany appreciated
system of relays and plug-ins, 
extrinsic linkages” (p. 356).
 By 1816, we are able 
to see the various mechanic 
assemblages that would produce 
intensities that could then 
externalize as Frankenstein: 
rejection, trauma, loss, grief 
producing machines. Attach to 
this grief machine a hideous 
figure within a nightmare…a 
figure whose “success would 
terrify the artist” (Shelley, 2017, 
p. 299), Shelley began to give a 
voice to the nightmare
but a tripartite constituting of 
among all three of these entities. 
 And yet another entity 
factors into this writing 
assemblage: the reader of a 
piece of writing. Deleuze (1990) 
and Guattari (1983) encourages 
the reader to approach writing 
as a schizophrenic, not as one 
who attempts to derive a precise 
meaning from the words present 
in a piece of writing, but as one 
who attempts to decompose 
those words into syllables and 
phonemes. What is left is not an
 The origins of the paper do 
not just come from the fusing 
together of new words and 
words of previous drafts. There 
are multiple roots spreading 
across the writing. There is the 
author, yet there are also all of 
the things that are both beyond 
and within the author. The first 
author and the second author 
are simultaneously writing 
separately, yet one has an 
influence on the other. Equally, 
the experiences and influences of 
each author are at play as well. 
They are themselves, yet the
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the juxtaposition of the 
monster’s appearance and 
(usually) kind nature, lauded 
his ability to fit into both the 
Gothic-Romantic sublime and 
pastoral setting. The reviewer 
states simply that “we even 
like a story the better that it is 
disjointed and irregular;” the 
writing style, the monster’s 
action, and the physical 
description of the monster 
itself contribute to a disjointed 
irregularity. 
 The Frankenstein monster 
manifests as a “phenomenon of 
bordering” (Deleuze and
a voice that was, both hers 
and the monster. Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980) state that, 
“Each of us is caught up in an 
assemblage…we reproduce 
its statements when we think 
we are speaking in our own 
name; or rather we speak in our 
own name when we produce 
its statement” (p. 6). Though 
Victor, the monster, and Walton 
would speak each in their own 
names, their statements were 
also Shelley’s statements. 
Content, author, and process
effect of language but a “pure 
language affect” (Deleuze, 
1990, p. 88) that plays upon 
and within the schizophrenic 
readers. For “reading a text is 
never a scholarly exercise in 
search of what is signified, still 
less a highly textual exercise in 
search of a signifier” (Deueluze 
& Guattari, 1983, p. 106). It 
is a surface-level, neurotic 
reading wherein words signify 
a particular meaning, being 
expressible and denotable, 
and it is this surface that the 
schizophrenic reader is able to 
see beyond: “as
sum of everything that has 
brought them to this place. each 
other. Within the lines of this 
paper, the first author’s Capoeira 
instructor and the second 
author’s Shakespeare professor 
shout over one another through 
the lines of prose, each voice 
competing for the territory of 
lines on the page until they 
reach a place where they can 
speak in concert with one 
another. 
 In a series of letters between 
Deleueze and Guattari about 
the nature of original thought, 
Delueze (1977) writes, 
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Guattari, 1987, p. 245), 
not quite human, not quite 
animal: an anomaly “which 
is outside the rules [and] 
goes against the rules” and 
an an-omalie, “the cutting 
edge of deterritorialization” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 
p. 244). Everything about the 
monster suggests a bordering 
phenomenon. It crosses the 
border between life and death, 
political, microbial, and 
anatomical borders—its body is 
a collective of sewn parts, an arm 
bordering a shoulder bordering a 
head: “bones from charnel
collapse into a singularity, 
manifesting as a book.
 Could we ever say that 
the author was alone with 
her nightmares and affects? 
Wolynn’s (2016) discusses the 
effects of trauma as they work 
upon genetics. These negative 
valences that wrote across 
Shelley’s body, Wolynn claims, 
can pass through generations 
in much the same way that one 
might physical features from 
parents. Trauma did not begin 
with Shelley. She represents a
there is no surface, the inside 
and the outside, the container 
and the contained, have no 
precise limit. They plunge into a 
universal depth” (p. 87). Within 
this depth, melding occurs. 
Words become utterances that 
create a space between author 
and reader wherein affect and 
intensity of language (sounds) 
manifest.
 What then does reading 
a text do? For Deleuze and 
Guattari (1983) reading is “a 
productive use of the literary 
machine, a
I would imagine myself 
approaching an author 
from behind, and making 
him a child, who would 
indeed be his, and would, 
nonetheless be monstrous. 
That the child would be his 
was very important because 
the author had to say, in 
effect, everything I made 
him say. But that the child 
should be monstrous was 
also a requisite because it 
was necessary to go through 
all kinds of decenterings, 
slidings, splittings
Joshua Cruz & Holly Corkill 147
houses,” other parts collected 
from “the dissecting room 
and slaughter house,” brought 
together not in a lab but a 
“workshop” (Shelley, 1818, p. 
55), which implies that unlike 
in Whale’s or Branagh’s media 
adaptations, the construction 
of the monster is not a 
scientific endeavor so much 
as a mechanic assembling of 
body parts over parts over 
parts. While this anatomical 
bordering is true of every body, 
the description of the monster as 
“uncouth and distorted” (p. 271) 
draws attention to the very
rhizomatic opening into the 
grief machine as we examine 
the map of grief through which 
various members of Shelley’s 
lineage had passed: traumas of 
parental loss, grief, violence, or 
rejection. They appear again in 
children, undergoing mutations 
that manifest as depressive 
affective states (Wolynn, 2016). 
Though born without the 
memory of the trauma, a child 
comes into the world with the 
parents’ trauma, nonetheless. 
What better example of a 
productive mechanic
montage of desiring-machines, a 
schizoid exercise that
extracts from the text its 
revolutionary force” (p. 106). 
We have already seen the 
various parts that compose 
this machine: the author, the 
text, the reader, and context(s) 
surrounding author, reader, and 
text, all assembled in a recursive 
intermingling; but what is the 
revolutionary force of a text? 
Deleuze and Guattari (1986) 
claim that the literary machine 
is a relay for “revolutionary 
machine-to-come,”
secret discharges, which 
have given me much 
pleasure (p. 112-113).
This idea of making an author 
who, in turn makes a monster, 
is the very essence of what 
it means to teach writing. 
Writers are not just writing 
as themselves; they are also 
writing as their teachers. The 
neuroses of writing is never 
one’s own—write in the 
margins…don’t use “I” …don’t 
use “you”…the body of an 
essay is five paragraphs…don’t 
use contractions in academic 
writing—these are not simply
The Frankenpaper148
physical bordering that 
occurs from part to part. To 
“Frankenstein” something is to 
cobble together from various 
components, to overlap the 
boundaries of one object, to take 
the cut-up and to reassemble 
it into an exercise of border 
crossing. The monster’s 
existence rails against political, 
vivacious, and bodily territories. 
It is a living embodiment of 
Burroughs’s cut-up, a method 
designed to de- and re-
territorialize (Moore, 2007), to 
upset and redefine boundaries; 
in doing so, it does indeed, as
assemblage? Couplings produce 
grief, but they also produce a 
child, an assemblage in its own 
right, coupled to a grief engine. 
Wolynn posits that one of the 
reasons that this epigenetic 
trauma becomes possible is 
because before we are even 
thought of, we are already part 
of our parents: our grandmother 
carries us as she carries our 
mother since there is a point in 
our mother’s fetal development 
where her body produces her 
own finitude of eggs. Chemical 
changes occurring in our 
father’s body and,
(p. 18). During this process, 
the author disappears from 
view, creating a “collective 
enunciation,” an enunciation 
of thought that has been (and 
will continue to be) acted 
upon by all. We might call this 
enunciation “kairotic” (Rickert, 
2013), a coming together of 
time and location that spills over 
into writing through a writer. 
But there is no individual, 
autonomous expression of 
thought in writing, and the 
writing is not the writer’s own. 
Instead, it is to be taken up by 
other; indeed, the author
organic instincts a writer is born 
knowing. One cannot enact 
good or bad writing without 
another first teaching someone 
how to enact it. Writers are the 
sum of themselves, but also 
their teachers; writing teachers 
know this. They fear the idea of 
their students going forth and 
producing monstrous writing as 
much as they fear their own bad 
writing.
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Walter Scott observed, “elude 
all pursuit” (Shelley, 1818, p. 
85) making itself imperceptible 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). 
We cannot see the spark of life 
that is given to the monster, 
despite Branagh’s or Whale’s 
attempts; we cannot see the 
monster as it crosses from 
country to country if it wishes 
to remain hidden; we cannot see 
the body of the monster as homo 
sapiens (Carretero-Gonzalez, 
2016)—only as an assemblage 
of overlapping parts.
impacting his mental health, 
become a part of the child’s at 
the time of conception. These 
affects are networked along 
various lines; we do not carry 
our mother and father’s trauma 
within us. We carry the trauma 
of our maternal and paternal 
grandparents, their parents, 
and so on, infinitely. Is the 
trauma really ours? Is fear of 
fire mine, or does it belong to 
the compositional forces that 
brought “me” about? We are 
an assemblage not just of our 
mother’s physical features, but 
also of the neuroses
becomes a “foreigner to 
one’s own tongue” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987, p. 388), 
subsumed and ultimately 
disappearing from the writing 
altogether. Joyce writes that 
his “head is full of pebbles and 
rubbish and broken matches 
and bits of glass picked up most 
everywhere” (Joyce, 1921). 
His head is permeated by this 
collection of foreign objects 
which spill onto his pages. The 
schizoid reader takes up the text, 
and once penetrated by printed 
words, engages in the act of 
“conjuring up the affect, and of
Josh’s Writing Reflection
 I think of all of the writing 
that I have done in the past; 
it pales to the writing that my 
colleagues have produced, 
and I know it pales to the 
writing that I will produce 
in the distant future. All that 
I have written and all that I 
will write: are they separate 
instances, each isolated from 
one another? Conventional 
wisdom in academia is to create 
a narrative of your research. 
Your work should speak to a 
particular interest, all housed 
within one neat
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 And while the parts overlap, 
they also decompose. When 
Frankenstein first beholds 
his creation, he describes the 
creature as having “yellow skin” 
that “scarcely covered the work 
of muscles and arteries beneath” 
(Shelley, 1818, p. 58). The 
monster’s body cannot contain 
the organs; the muscles and 
arteries burst forth from beneath 
the monster’s skin making the 
body “permeated by unformed, 
unstable matters” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987, p. 4). We have, 
then, a physical body without
psychoses, and traumas, 
always at play with one 
another, influencing and 
inscribeing themselves into our 
compositional makeup. 
 And these affects, these 
intensities that might be 
inscribed within Shelley spill 
over, onto paper. Shelley’s first 
experience of trauma, the loss 
of her mother, is one that is 
spoken by multiple characters 
throughout Frankenstein—or, 
rather, it is the experience of her 
characters as much as it is her 
own. Consider the monster, for 
example. In the same
transforming the painful passion 
of the body into a triumphant 
action” (p. 88). A text is not 
written so much as it writes; it 
inscribes itself upon the reader. 
This is the “revolutionary force” 
that the schizoid extracts from 
text: a changing of affect and 
disposition, a deterritorialization 
of stability, a call to action 
within the reader, whatever that 
action may be.
 And now we may begin 
to think about what the body 
without organs of a book might 
be. First, it is important to think 
about use of
story about who you are as a 
researcher: “I am a qualitative 
researcher; see how my work is 
all qualitative? I am interested 
in writing. See how all of these 
pieces of writing are about 
writing?” While I balk at the 
necessity of this (why should we 
be pigeonholed?), I wonder if 
it is possible to escape. Derrida 
(1981) talks about the preface—
anything is a preface to anything 
else. When one reads the end to 
a novel, it is the preface to the 
beginning of the novel were we 
to read it again, as we will
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organs, a body that seems 
to be refusing the organs 
inside of it. The body without 
organs as described by 
Deleuze and Guattari is at 
least partially physical: it is 
“matter that occupies space to 
a given degree: to the degree 
corresponding to the degree of 
intensities produced” (p. 153), 
as well as something “produced, 
at a certain place and a certain 
time in the connective synthesis, 
as the identity of producing and 
the product” (1983, p. 8). It is 
brought out spatially when it is 
called into
way that the monster suddenly 
becomes present in the story, the 
product of a vague process of 
assembly that readers are never 
a party to. He, rather, is birthed 
from Mary Shelley’s mind; we 
might imagine Athena emerging 
from the head of Zeus. Or 
perhaps he, an intensity of grief, 
tears through her head in the 
way that a child tears from the 
vagina. Many of her characters 
are without mothers: Victor 
loses his natural mother at a 
young age. Elizabeth first loses 
her natural parents and
the word “of,” as this word 
forces us to consider the 
indeterminacy of language. 
It is impossible to tell what 
exactly “of” signifies. On the 
one hand, it refers to the body 
without organs that composes 
the book, as in “a book made 
of paper.” In this case, the 
book simply is a body without 
organs. Alternatively, the body 
without organs is composed by 
the book, in the phrase “of the 
land.” It comes from, is created 
by. Likely, it is both. The body 
without organs is the blank slate 
upon and through which
begin to anticipate the expected 
ending. Or, the end of a novel 
prefaces the beginning of 
another piece of work entirely. 
The end to one novel primes our 
affective states, and colors the 
rest of anything we might read 
after it. A reading colonizes our 
minds, inscribing it indelibly 
across, prefacing anything we 
might read afterward. 
 Why should this not be the 
case for writing? Can it be that 
writing is also the preface to 
anything else I will ever write?
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space by the intensities that 
inhabit it, however it is also the 
metaphysical body that refuses 
to let one intensity dominate. For 
the capitalist, the body without 
organs is capital (1983), for the 
masochist it is implements of 
pleasure-torture, for the drug 
user it is a becoming cold; it is 
a way of being for each body 
(1987). As these intensities 
write themselves across the 
body without organs, it becomes 
extended into a spatial body, 
that of the capitalist, etc. But the 
body without organs prevents a 
neurotic tie to
then her adopted mother. 
Also, on his letter to his sister, 
Walton indicates that he grew 
up under his sister’s “gentle and 
feminine fosterage” and that his 
father died when he was young 
(Shelley, 1818, p. 9), which 
suggests that Walton has also 
grown up without a mother. 
Along with a lack of consistent 
natural maternal influences or 
affection in the story, the one 
statement Mary Shelley makes 
regarding the presence of a 
mother figure mirrors her own 
relationship with Mary Jane
intensities pass, the point of 
0 intensity itself (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987). Imagine a 
hyper-permeable cell with no 
organelles. The organelles are 
all outside of the cell. But that 
hpyerpermeability would allow 
those organelles to enter and 
leave as time passed. Perhaps 
only mitochondria passes 
through at one point—then 
it is a cell of mitochondria, 
an energy cell. The 
mitochondria is briefly joined 
by chloroplasts. It is then an 
energy producing cell and a 
photosynthetic cell. When the
Nearly a decade ago, I wrote 
my first publication. It was a 
socio-cognitive piece on identity 
and writing. We might see how 
that is the preface to a piece 
like the one I am currently 
writing—concerned about 
issues of writing, about (non)
identity, about constructing and 
assembling sentences. But it is 
also the preface to anything I 
have written, whether the topic 
is writing or not, identity or not, 
assembling or not. Traces of 
the ideas of that paper (and any 
paper I have written) exist
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these intensities or desires, act-
ing as a barrier to desire-produc-
tion (1983; 1987): a blank can-
vas, a place itself of 0 intensity. 
It is not intensity itself, but the 
space through which intensities 
are able to unfold, and as each 
being is a multiplicity, the in-
tensity of desiring-production is 
able to erase and re-write itself 
across the body without organs. 
A capitalist body becomes the 
masochist body becomes the 
drug using body and so on.
Clairmont. Though Justine 
Moritz does have a mother, 
the relationship is strained. 
According to Victor, “This girl 
had always been the favourite of 
her father, but through a strange 
perversity, her mother could 
not endure her, and after the 
death of M. Moritz, treated her 
very ill” (Shelley, 1818, p. 68). 
Mary Shelley’s addition of this 
record of constant mistreatment 
of Justine at the hands of 
Madame Moritz then becomes 
the author’s expression of the 
trauma inflicted upon her by
mitochondria leave, then it 
becomes a photosynthesizing 
cell, until other organelles 
pass through and inscribe their 
actions into this hypothetical 
cell without organelles, much 
like Joyce’s head.
 Within a schizoid reader, 
text becomes a howling that is 
“welded together in breath… 
like the bones in the blood of the 
body without organs” (Deleuze, 
1990, p. 89). The schizophrenic 
reader is a body without organs 
acted upon by the text, which 
itself is a locus of
in those papers that I currently 
write or ever will write, 
whether they are subtle or 
overt, apparent or lurking in the 
background. There is always a 
narrative, even if that narrative 
does not show progress, even if 
that narrative is disjointed and 
irregular, even if that narrative 
is difficult to thematize.
 Perhaps this idea of a 
perfect narrative also has its 
roots in this enlightenment value 
of perfection, which is easy to 
understand, to recognize, to 
pigeonhole. This researcher has
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 Just so, the Frankenstein 
monster operates in this 
bordering between the physical 
and the point of 0 intensity. 
The monster is a body without 
organs, in the most literal and 
figurative uses of the term—a 
neutral pile of dead flesh, acting 
as a physically manifest 0 point 
of intensity upon which the mad 
doctor may inscribe his toils and 
obsessions. But, just as the body 
without organs rejects a stable 
production of desire (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1983), the monster 
rejects being the Pygmalion
an indifferent stepmother. 
This is not an instance of an 
author writing from experience. 
Rather, it may be understood 
as an experience taking over 
an author: there is grief in this 
instance, one that manifests 
as the absent mother (which 
certainly was within the author’s 
realm of experience) but the 
grief penetrates bloodlines. 
The grieving machine attaches 
to Shelley: the Shelley-grief 
assemblage produces a text.
intensities that has been 
inscribed by a nameless author, 
that inscribes itself upon the 
reader, breathing a life of new 
affect into the schizoid reader. 
As I sit, writing these words, a 
friend beside me plays a video 
game; currently, she is fighting 
a monster called a siren, an 
ethereal spirit-creature which 
has the ability to reanimate dead 
bodies and call them to arms. 
The bodies have been wounded, 
gutted; they too are without 
heads, entrails, limbs, and a 
force deterritorializes them as 
corpses, making
no ties to any other being 
and, by Kant’s standards, is 
“free.” But when we think 
about the predictability that 
must accompany this writing 
in the academy, or as a result 
of a demanding audience or 
genre concerns, how far can 
we actually say that the one 
writing is free? When we must 
pretend that the writing was 
neat, tidy, that it began at point 
A and ended at point B with no 
meandering thoughts seeping 
in, we are putting on a show. 
When we claim that there is an 
untroubled
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sculpture of Victor’s desire—
Victor must rewrite various 
intensities across his monstrous 
body without organs, filling it 
at different times with disgust-
desiring, hate-desiring, and 
revenge-desiring. The monster 
sloughs off his role as a 
physical body without organs 
for Victor and engages in the 
act of inscription upon its own 
body without organs. Within 
the monster, the two planes 
of 0 intensity come together: 
the monster as Victor’s own 
body without organs physically 
manifest, and the
 Shelley becomes a vessel 
for traumatic intensities; it is 
not she that speaks through 
her book, but those intensities 
that are written upon her via 
the contexts from which she 
emerges. Along with her lack of 
being nurtured was her inability 
to nurture—specifically, the loss 
of her first child. The motherless 
child fails to nurture her own. 
If we understand grief as an 
intensity that can inscribe itself 
across generations, that lurks 
and looms in its own monstrous 
capacity, then
them new. As I watch this 
occurring on the screen, I think 
about the siren as a piece of text, 
creating a revolution within these 
bodies, initially lifeless, points of 
0 intensity, ready to be inscribed 
by the intensity of the siren. 
The thought within a text, state 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) “is 
like the vampire” (p. 377) and 
we know that a vampire infects 
(p. 242). The words in a text do 
not tell, but they spread, creating 
armies of revolting bodies of 
action and affect. Vampires, 
sirens, undead bodies
writing process, we do 
disservice to those learning 
to write, making them think 
that they are bad writers when 
not every piece falls into 
place (Lamott, 1994); such 
perfectionism kills creativity. 
We attempt to hide or smooth 
out the sutures that hold our 
writing together, but in doing so, 
we are being honest with neither 
our readers nor ourselves.
 Such suturing, I believe, 
gets at the real nature of 
Frankenwriting. Each individual 
piece of writing is assembled of 
various pieces
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monster as desiring agent acting 
upon/with his own body without 
organs. We see such inscription 
as the monster realizes he 
has been abandoned by the 
De Laceys. He experiences a 
“luxury of sensation” (Shelley, 
1818, p. 162) that initially 
he cannot endure. He allows 
himself “to be borne away by 
the stream” (p. 165) of hatred 
as his body without organs “sets 
up a counterflow of amorphous, 
undifferentiated fluid” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1983, p. 9) that 
fuels his hate- and destruction-
desiring. The
perhaps it was too much for the 
child to bear; grief transmutes 
itself from mother to child and 
left Shelley unable to carry her 
first child to term. We might say 
that Mary Shelley’s portrayal of 
the failed first meeting between 
father and child in Frankenstein 
was her way of processing her 
trauma and disappointment at 
Percy Shelley’s rejection of their 
own child, a premature girl who 
died shortly after her birth in 
1815 (Badalamenti, 2006). We 
might just as soon say that this 
rejection also became
without organs, Artaud’s 
Jabberwocky monster (Deleuze, 
1990): writing is an exercise in 
creating textual monsters and 
(re)animating bodies. 
 Monsters, it seems, always 
emerge from darkness or mist—
some space of indeterminacy. 
Within these spaces, there 
is always potential. They 
exemplify what Deleuze 
referred to as a virtual space 
(Wallin, 2010). Reality may be 
constituted and arranged in a 
number of ways, and Deleuze’s 
challenge to us
of writing external to it, whether 
these pieces actually take 
textual shape or not. A piece of 
writing has every potential to be 
something different than what it 
is: an idea may be expressed in 
a different way, a sentence may 
connect to another sentence with 
a semicolon rather than a period, 
or on a larger scale, a different 
topic may be approached in a 
similar fashion, or in the case of 
an academic paper, a different 
theory may be chosen to situate 
a piece of information. These 
are all tools at our
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body without organs rejects 
the reason of language, rejects 
interrupting thoughts and 
“utters only gasps and cries 
that are sheer unarticulated 
blocks of sound” (p. 9). It is 
“the reversion of thought and 
perception-action into pure 
sensation” (Massumi, 2002, 
p. 109), of which the monster 
allows himself to experience 
a luxury. We see the monster, 
a body without organs and an 
actor upon/with a body without 
organs, operating in this state 
of aphasiac, fluid, intense 
sensation:
a part of Mary Shelley’s body 
without organs, passing through 
her arm, her hand, her pen, and 
into the text of Frankenstein. 
As Victor regards his efforts, he 
goes so far as to call the monster 
an “abortive creation” (Shelley, 
1818, p. 38). Victor’s rejection 
of his creature may be seen as a 
kairotic moment (Rickert, 2013) 
a manifestation of all aspects of 
the malformed, miscarried and 
misgendered body that Mary 
had conceived and carried for 
seven months—
is an “ethical impetus against 
the world in advance” (Wallin, 
p. 27). Writing is not a given; 
if writing is a monster, then the 
author is the obscuring mist 
from which the writing must 
meander out of. The form the 
writing takes, however, should 
be unknown until it emerges; no 
method, no process, no stable or 
transcendental structure should 
tell us what that writing will 
look like.
 And just as Victor 
Frankenstein gives us no clue as 
to the method used to reanimate 
his
disposal, used to assemble a 
piece of text. If enough of the 
parts are different, then we can 
assemble a different paper. Or 
we might go through with some 
of these parts and revise what 
we have written, cutting away 
here, adding there, placing 
certain items in our respective 
shit-I-cut folders for later use. 
Every paper, themselves all 
Frankenthings, constitute a 
whole body of writing, some 
pieces of which may be loosely 
connected to others, hanging 
only by a thread, but always a 
preface.
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[the wind] produced a 
kind of insanity in my 
spirits that burst all 
bounds of reason and 
reflection. I lighted the 
dry branch of a tree 
and danced with fury 
around the devoted 
cottage … with a loud 
scream I fired the straw, 
and heath, and bushes, 
which I had collected. 
The wind fanned the 
fire, and the cottage
a malformed and unviable being 
passed through her own body 
without organs. 
 Within the writing of 
Frankenstein, we cannot discount 
others who may assemble and 
connect to Shelley’s writing 
machine. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) open one of their works 
by stating “The two of us wrote 
Anti-Oedipus together. Since 
each of us was several, there 
was already quite a crowd” 
(p. 3). Is there any doubt that 
Shelley could have said the 
same? According to Badalamenti 
(2006), one of the
monster, there is no process for 
the spread of ideas in this way 
because, like the monster, ideas 
are uncontrollable. Thought 
exists “in a smooth space that it 
must occupy without counting, 
and for which there is no 
possible method, no conceivable 
reproduction, but only relays, 
intermezzos, resurgences” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 
p. 377). Thoughts—texts—
encounter readers and form 
a literary machines, having 
various effects on those readers 
that the author of the text cannot 
control. Here, we
In some ways, I wonder if the 
Frankenmonster is the best 
analogy for writing. Instead, 
it is as though I have a kraken 
with hundreds of tentacles 
inside me; at various points, a 
tentacle reaches out, comprising 
a piece of writing; the tentacles 
themselves are lines of flight, 
various manifestations of 
thought that all connect in 
some form. We can follow the 
tentacles back to their origin 
points only to discover that 
they connect to other tentacles, 
twisting around one another, 
forming linkages
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was quickly enveloped 
by the flames (Shelley, 
p. 165-166). 
The monster, despite his 
attempts, has not been able to 
join the world that would seek to 
place Oedipal barriers of social 
and psychic repression. Anything 
but autistic, the monster becomes 
animal, a howling wolfman, 
a dancing, fire-producing 
Neanderthal, a monster in its 
darkest connotations of the term: 
open to intensities of experience, 
beyond the reaches of rational 
language, not bound at all by 
reason or
strongest influences on the 
novel was Mary Shelley’s 
husband Percy who, upon 
Mary’s completion of the work, 
reviewed the novel, revising 
it at points and explicitly 
contributed his own voice to 
the story by writing the preface. 
Shelley admits to the infiltration 
of Percy influence into the body 
of the novel in the author’s 
introduction written to append 
to the revision of the work she 
released in 1831. At the time of 
this publication, Shelley wrote 
that the “several pages” of the 
original work
begin to think about what a real 
post-process theory might look 
like. A text, a paper, a thought 
constantly evolves, constantly 
emerges. This flies in the face 
of more traditional rhetoric and 
writing wisdom: the canons 
of Cicero, the conventions of 
genre, signposts designed to 
lead readers down a particular 
path. What does writing look 
like when we think of our read-
ers as bodies without organs, 0 
intensities, forming a literary 
machine with our writing?
and overlaps and knots. Then 
again, the kraken is its own kind 
of Frankenmonster, assembled 
over hundreds of years of 
folklore, borrowing from 
various cultures’ superstitions 
about water monsters. 
 Whether it be a kraken 
or Frankenstein, or vampire, 
or ghost that haunts, calling 
writing a monster is accurate 
because part of the allure of 
a monster is that it cannot be 
controlled. These creatures are 
notoriously difficult to locate 
and rid oneself of, and that is 
certainly
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reflection. He is the schizophrenic 
visibly resisting Oedipalization 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 52), 
the ‘rational’ being that caves into 
absolute irrationality as he burns 
the very symbol of the traditional, 
daddy-mommy-me triangle—the 
pastoral, domestic cottage.
 Still, we Oedipalize; we 
see in the Frankenstein films 
a kind of accounting for the 
monster: sexualizing it with 
eels and probes, identifying 
the spark of life with 
observable lightening. The 
same is true in the novel; there
reflected “many a walk, 
many a drive, and many a 
conversation when [she] was 
not alone” (Shelley, 2017, p. 
300). She further alludes to her 
“companion,” indicating that 
she will see this person “no 
more” (Shelley, 2017, p. 300). 
Here, it is not necessarily the 
intensities of grief or trauma 
that spur the text, but another 
individual, triangulated into 
being by his own multiplicities, 
his own intensities, that further 
contributes to the work. Indeed, 
some of the key aspects of 
Frankenstein,
 While compositionists, 
those responsible for a post-
process movement, seem 
to have largely ignored this 
question, we find many 
examples of Deleuzian writing 
theory in qualitative research. 
Wyatt, Gale, Gannon, and 
Davies (2011), for instance, 
explore how individuated 
co-authors blur and overlap, 
bringing various intensities to 
one another, indelibly shaping 
one another’s thoughts as they 
wrote together: “instead of 
exploring Deleuze as an abstract 
set of propositions, we
the case with the thoughts that 
produce writing, at least within 
me. I would describe some of 
my most intense moments of 
writing as flow, when I become 
unaware of the world around 
me, fully enveloped in putting 
words to paper. In this case, 
the thoughts behind writing 
possess me. I can’t not write. 
Or if I refuse, something will 
seem off; I become hyperactive, 
squirmy, unable to concentrate 
on some other task until the idea 
is fleshed in writing. And how 
interesting that it must be
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is a need to control the monster 
via the narrative of its life, 
accounting for his thoughts 
and actions. At the end of the 
novel, Victor identifies the 
monster, before anything else, 
as “rational” (Shelley, 1818, p. 
269). These words fly in the face 
of the above passage, wherein 
the monster allows himself to 
be moved by sensation and 
intensity, those affects that 
inscribe themselves upon his 
body without organs, an act of 
anti-rationality, pure intensity
including names of the 
character, came directly from 
Percy’s experience, rather than 
Shelley’s head.
 It is also difficult to read 
Frankenstein without also 
considering the immediate 
connections of Mary and Percy 
Shelley to their Romantic 
contemporaries. Along with 
providing Mary Shelley a place 
into which she could explore 
the complicated web of her 
relationships, the novel also 
provided her with an inlet to 
explore and problematize the 
way
brought his concepts to life in 
our collaborating bodies and 
our unfolding engagements with 
life in its specificity—and in its 
Being. We sought to unleash 
the creative voice of matter 
in our engagement in [our] 
assemblage” (Wyatt et al., 2014, 
p. 409). Guttorm (2012), reacting 
to Wyatt et al. (2011), writes 
about how a paper is never quite 
under her control—ideas shift 
and evolve, and she reflects upon 
this experience using poetic 
language. The poetic language, 
she states, is designed to open a 
stream that flows
fleshed out—part of the 
hideousness of the Frankenstein 
monster was the fact that it 
was not fully fleshed. Its skin 
could barely contain itself; this 
appearance created a negative 
response in those that beheld it. 
 As Victor created his 
monster, he seemed to be in a 
similar state of flow. He lost 
track of time, he disappeared 
from his friends, he stopped 
eating. He too was fully 
enveloped in his composition, 
fleshing out the body of work 
that he saw as his. And yet, it 
was not until he
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 And this is the nature 
of Oedipus: “a fantastic 
repression” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983, p. 3), one which 
seeks to create an arborescent 
singularity in place of the 
rhizomatic multiplicity of the 
monster (Heymans, 2011). By 
the monster’s account, it was, 
after all, his exposure to the 
cruelty exacted upon him by 
the humans he encountered 
that made him the villain his 
creator believed him to be. 
The monster’s linear, narrative 
account is a shame and a
that many of her contemporaries, 
including her husband, placed 
excessive faith in “science to 
answer questions about life 
and nature, expecting scientists 
to articulate a consistent 
worldview that would help 
people understand the vast world 
around them” (Hogsette, 2011, p. 
534). Along with this reliance on 
science to explain the mysteries 
of the world, proponents of 
the Enlightenment, such as 
Kant, believed that human 
maturity occurred only when an 
individual abandoned the need to 
rely on
from those authors that she has 
read and that have inspired her 
thinking—she is an example 
of the reader as body without 
organs, being called to action 
by a text. Her call to action is 
a revolution of thoughts. More 
recently, a book was released 
that examines how we might 
use Deleuze to write in the 
academy and create monsters 
from our writing (Riddle, Bright 
& Honan, 2018). It is strange 
that so few compositionists 
seem to have employed Deleuze 
and Guattari within their works; 
these
had produced his body that he 
realized what he had created, 
beheld the ugliness that he 
then allowed to wreak havoc 
across the world. Though it was 
months before any sign of the 
creature would appear again, it 
was always in the back of his 
mind, filling him with sickness 
and anxiety. What better way 
to describe the process of 
submitting or sharing a paper 
and waiting for a reader to 
respond? At the grade school or 
high school level, we write an 
essay and await criticism from 
the teacher. On
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testament to the Oedipalizing 
repression that Victor, as well as 
the DeLaceys, the villagers that 
attack him, and the individual 
who shot him, force the monster 
into. The monster is a body 
without organs manifest and a 
phenomenon of bordering; it is 
this image of wildness which 
creates horror in others as well 
as a desire to tame and control. 
The monster’s becoming animal 
places it into an unrecognizable 
species (Carretero-Gonzalez, 
2016), and it is not allowed to 
operate within a
another’s intelligence instead of 
their own. According to Kant, 
enlightenment required only 
freedom, and an individual 
gained that freedom when they 
sought to “walk alone” even at 
the risk of failure (Kant, 1784, 
p. 1). For Shelley, the monster 
is the embodiment of the 
Enlightenment’s focus on the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge 
turned monstrous, without any 
thought to moral responsibility 
(Hogsette, 2011). Though 
mentors and teachers such as the 
repugnantly described
pieces, largely written by 
qualitative researchers, might 
offer an excellent place to begin.
 But to our original question, 
what does a Deleuzian approach 
to post-process writing look 
like? And how might we employ 
this pedagogically? Pedagogy 
has been a bugbear of the post-
process movement (Kent, 1999; 
Heard, 2008, Mays 2017). How 
to make something non-process-
oriented, non-methodological, 
teachable? Deleuze suggested 
that we adopt an
Facebook, a post is submitted, 
and we wait to see how others 
will like it. Perhaps the stakes 
are lower than releasing a 
zombie into the world, but 
the waiting is the same; we 
anticipate how others will 
respond to our writing, we wait 
for the criticism or the feedback, 
and we dread the mistakes and 
errors that we have made, which 
only seem to make themselves 
apparent after we have finished 
our toils. We have no control 
over our writing at that point; 
we were simply the toiling force
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space reserved for those that 
are recognizable. For one 
that is driven by passions and 
intensities, one that has no 
Oedipal beginnings, no physical 
coherence, there is no world to 
live in. The creature must live 
among borders and margins, 
and there is no end but to exile 
oneself and, perhaps, die.
 What might we take away 
from all of this? Alkon (2002) 
suggests that “the role of 
science in Frankenstein, as in 
so much subsequent science 
fiction, is not so much to
Krempe discourage Victor’s 
interests in alchemy, Victor 
fuses alchemy with the science 
of enlightenment and creates 
an abomination. Along with 
the monster representing Mary 
Shelley’s warning of how 
Enlightenment results in the 
practice of science without the 
temperance of morality, Mary 
Shelley also uses Frankenstein 
to critique the Age of 
Enlightenment’s pursuit of human 
perfection (Cook, 2019). In the 
novel, one of the reasons that 
Victor pursues the creation of
attitude of transcendental 
empiricism (St. Pierre, 2016); 
in line with his concepts of 
difference and the virtual, 
he suggested that we break 
with claims about what is in 
the world. An author cannot, 
with certainty, determine the 
ways that audience will react 
to a piece of writing. Instead, 
we should focus on what has 
the potential to emerge (from 
writing). Nietzsche’s writing 
was taken up by the Nazi 
cause, used by the monster that 
was Adolph Hitler, although 
Nietzsche could never have
that brought the piece of text 
into existence (and even then, 
how much credit can we actually 
take? We had no control over the 
desires that manifest to drive us 
to put pen to paper). The piece 
itself, then, disseminates its 
own ideas as others come into 
contact with it. It is no longer 
an author-text machine, but a 
reader-text machine. Perhaps it 
will be received well, but there 
is always risk.
 This leads to some 
interesting questions which I 
am not ready to answer. For 
instance, from a
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consider scientific realities 
as to afford a unique vantage 
point for contemplation of the 
human condition” (p. 5). Could 
this human condition be one of 
scientization as criticized by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 
1987) and Massumi (2002)? 
The free, detached, a-multiple 
rationality of Kantian (1784) 
enlightenment? Certainly 
it is science that creates the 
condition of the monster, a 
condition which may then be 
reviled as horrific and irrational. 
Perhaps Shelley (1818) herself, 
a close associate of the
his creature is that he wishes 
to create a perfect human 
being that can defeat death. 
The monster then becomes a 
product and portent of efforts 
to achieve human perfection 
outside of the confines of the 
mentorship of morality; he also 
becomes Shelley’s critique of 
the Enlightenment’s drive for 
a freedom of discovery that 
rejects any sort of morality and 
instead relies solely on science 
in the pursuit of knowledge. 
However, what we may learn 
from this is that ideas do not 
spontaneously emerge
anticipated this (Higgins 
& Solomon, 2000). Joyce 
acknowledged that his readers 
would add more to his writing, 
constantly guessing at its 
meaning, filling in blanks, 
theorizing, but never entirely 
aware of how his work might 
inspire others—only that it 
would inspire (Ellmann, 1982). 
In this, there is a potential lesson 
to engender within students if 
one is to take seriously a post-
process pedagogy. That the 
effects and affects of writing 
will always be uncertain—that 
we can imbue as much
Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, 
how responsible is the author 
for their piece of writing? If an 
author is simply overcome with 
intensities and must produce, 
then we cannot blame the author 
for what is written (should we 
blame Victor for his creation?). 
And if the text takes on its own 
life as it comes into contact with 
readers, we certainly cannot 
blame the author for the way 
that the text is taken up. And 
yet, I feel that there is a weight 
as I write, a need to make sure I 
express an
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Satanic poets, was making 
a case for the wandering 
schizoid, criticizing the over 
determination that was present 
in the sciences even in the early 
1800s.
within authors’ minds to be 
written. We might say, rather, 
that ideas are inscribed within 
an author; they use the author, 
rather than the author uses them, 
insisting that the author write 
them. Ideas are negotiated, 
and they rewrite themselves 
as they come into contact with 
other ideas, as others attach 
themselves to the writing 
assemblage of author-idea-
context-infinity.
meaning into a text as we 
may want, but it will always 
escape us as others come into 
contact with it. But from a 
transcendentally empirical 
perspective, this is appropriate. 
Writing is not necessarily 
meaningful, but generative. 
Rather than a post-process 
pedagogy, we must ask: how do 
we teach generativity, creativity, 
works that inspire internal 
and external revolutions while 
erasing ourselves and static 
notions of what writing needs to 
be from the conversation?
idea clearly, try to bridge my 
mind with my audience’s, 
although I do not know who 
will actually be reading my 
work. This is perhaps a neurosis 
on my end, one brought about 
by years of believing that I have 
some control. I wonder what a 
different approach to teaching 
writing might look like, one that 
allows us to think of our textual 
creations as creatures that we 
instill with life that will then, on 
their own accord, leave us and 
produce their own meaning.
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